Trusts - Charitable Trusts - Ascertainment of Dominant Intent in Application of Cy Pres by Gunckel, Stuart S.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 59 Issue 4 
1961 
Trusts - Charitable Trusts - Ascertainment of Dominant Intent in 
Application of Cy Pres 
Stuart S. Gunckel 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Stuart S. Gunckel, Trusts - Charitable Trusts - Ascertainment of Dominant Intent in Application of Cy Pres, 
59 MICH. L. REV. 651 (1961). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/16 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
1961 ] RECENT DECISIONS 651 
TRUSTS - CHARITABLE TRUSTS -AsCERTAINMENT OF DOMINANT INTENT 
IN APPLICATION OF CY PRES - Testator made a residuary bequest to the city 
of Detroit "for a playfield for white children." The city agreed to accept 
this bequest if the racial restriction were removed under the doctrine of cy 
pres. In an action by the heirs to recover the bequest, the circuit court 
refused the application of the doctrine of cy pres although the city could 
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not accept the gift unless it was permitted to establish a playfield for children 
of all races.1 On appeal, held, affirmed, by an evenly-divided court. Cy pres 
wiII not be applied in the absence of phrases in the wiII or evidence in the 
record indicating a purpose broader than the literal terms of the gift. La 
Fond v. City of Detroit, 357 Mich. 362, 98 N.W.2d 530 (1959). 
In another case, another testator bequeathed $30,000 plus his residual 
estate to Amherst College "to be held in trust to be used as a scholarship 
loan fund for deserving American born, Protestant, Gentile boys of good 
moral repute, not given to gambling, smoking, drinking or similar acts." 
Amherst offered to accept the money in trust free from the "Protestant" and 
"Gentile" restrictions.2 On the executor's petition for construction of the 
will, held, Amherst can administer the trust free from these restrictions. 
The testator's primary intent was the education of boys at his alma mater 
and the other restrictions were not paramount. This conclusion is "inescapa-
ble" in light of the absence of a gift-over, the lack of an alternative charitable 
disposition in the will, the testator's want of a particular religious tenet, and 
his distant relationship with his next of kin. Howard Savings Institution 
v. Trustees of Amherst College, 61 N.J. Super. 119, 160 A.2d 177 (1960). 
The doctrine of cy pres is invoked under proper circumstances when the 
named object of a charitable gift is unable to receive the gift. Rather than 
passing by intestacy or by a residuary devise, the gift is applied to the broad 
purposes which would have been achieved by the use of the particular means 
named in the wiII. The basic tenet of cy pres is that the testator's dominant 
intent was to effectuate the broad objective rather than to employ the par• 
ticular means.3 This doctrine applies only to charitable gifts, probably 
because a broad intent is more likely to be present than in a gift to a private 
party and because the courts tend to favor charities.4 However, a court may 
be restrained by the fear that application of cy pres where there is both a 
lack of evidence of broad intent and a suggestion of specific intent amounts 
to confiscation of private property.I' 
A significant issue in these cases is the treatment of religious and racial 
restrictions as part of dominant intent. By refusing the application of cy 
pres to purposes broader than the racial restrictions, the court in the La 
1 Girard Will Case, 353 U.S. 230 (1957). Cf. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.146 (1948). 
2 Amherst declined the bequest on these terms on the grounds that the school was 
prohibited from discriminating by N.J. REv. STAT. § 18:251-1 (Supp. 1940). Actually, there 
was no failure here because the court held this statute inapplicable to a private school. 
Therefore, the only defect was the want of a trustee due to Amherst's declination. See 
note 7 infra. 
8 4 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 399 (2d ed. 1956); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 399 (1959). 
4 Noel v. Olds, 138 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. 
Williams, 50 R.I. 385, 148 Atl. 189 (1929); In re Mills' Will, 121 Misc. 147, 200 N.Y. Supp. 
701 (Surr. Ct. 1923). 
5 Fisch, The Cy Press Doctrine and Changing Philosophies, 51 MICH. L. REv. 375, 381 
(1953); Scott, Education and the Dead Hand, 34 HARV. L. REv. 1, 16 (1920); Quimby v. 
Quimby, 175 Ill. App. 367 (1912); Gladding v. Saint Matthew's Church, 25 R.I. 628, 57 Atl. 
860 (1904). 
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Fond case defers to the sensitive nature of such restrictions.6 In sharp con• 
trast is the cavalier treatment of racial and religious restrictions by the court 
in the Howard case which neglects an alternative plan that would have 
corrected the defect while retaining the testator's literal intent.7 Because of 
the personal and sometimes violent opinions on religion and race which a 
person often has, it is probable that such restrictions are a manifestation 
of the testator's dominant intent. Thus, a court should be very hesitant 
to declare that a testator had an intent broader than these restrictions. The 
American courts more frequently take this position, while English and 
Canadian courts in some cases have appeared less reluctant to transcend 
these restrictions.s 
The contrasting attitude of the courts in the two principal cases toward 
racial and religious restrictions perhaps reflects basically different approaches 
to finding a general charitable intent. The court in the La Fond case 
rigidly requires positive clues of a general intent from the will and record.9 
On the other hand, in the Howard case additional reliance is placed on the 
failure to prove a specific intent.10 These cases may also reflect the wide-
spread confusion caused by the contradictory decisions and thin distinctions 
which have characterized the effort by courts to ascertain the dominant 
intent.11 
One reaction to this confusion has been enactment of legislation which 
would channel property originally bequeathed to charity to other charitable 
purposes unless the testator has "otherwise expressly provided."12 More-
over, the statute expressly places the obligation to find in the will a specific 
6 However, the La Fond court indicated a desire to apply cy pres in aid of charities. 
357 Mich. at 366, 98 N.W.2d at 532. 
7 Actually, this case involved not a failure of the gift but rather the absence of a 
trustee to carry out the terms of the gift since Amherst had declined. It seems clear now 
that a court will not let a trust fail for want of a trustee. 4 Scon, TRUSTS § 397 (2d ed. 
1956); St. Peter's Church v. Brown, 21 R.I. 367, 43 Atl. 642 (1899). The court might have 
relied upon the Girard will cases to appoint a private trustee who, using testator's standards, 
would award scholarships to students attending or about to attend Amherst. Girard Will 
Case, 386 Pa. 548, 127 A.2d 287 (1956), reu'd, 353 U.S. 230 (1957); Girard College Trustee-
ship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844 (1958). Of course, Amherst might then have refused to 
participate in this discriminatory scheme by refusing to admit the recipients of the awards. 
B Religious restrictions held part of the dominant intent: Craft v. Shroyer, 81 Ohio 
App. 253, 74 N.E.2d 589 (1947); Petition of Rochester Trust Co., 94 N.H. 207, 49 A.2d 
922 (1946); State v. Van Buren School Dist. No. 42, 191 Ark. 1096, 89 s:w .2d 605 (1936); 
Matter of MacDowell, 217 N.Y. 454, 112 N.E. 177 (1916) (dictum). Contra, Trustee of 
Pittsfield Academy v. Attorney General, 95 N.H. 51, 57 A.2d 161 (1948); Re Hogle, [1939] 
Ont. 425, [1939] 4 D.L.R. 817; In re Queen's School, Chester, [1910] I Ch. 796. See 
generally Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 78. Racial restrictions held part of dominant intent: Moore 
v. City&: County of Denver, 133 Colo., 190,292 P.2d 986 (1956) (dictum); Grimke v. Attorney 
General, 206 Mass. 49, 91 N.E. 899 (1910); Girard will cases, supra note 7. 
o 357 Mich. at 367-68, 98 N.W.2d at 533. 
10 61 N.J. Super. at 128, 160 A.2d at 182. 
112A BOGERT, TRUSTS §§ 436,437 (2d ed. 1953). Comment, 49 YALE L.J. 303, 323 (1939). 
12 FISCH, THE CY PRES DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES § 3.02 (b) (1950). Such legis-
lation has been enacted in this form by Pennsylvania. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.10 
(1950). See generally 4 PowELL, REAL PROPERTY § 587 (1st ed. 1954). 
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intent on the heirs and residuary legatees, who unknowingly may have this 
burden at the present time.13 On the other hand, the statute would obstruct 
the testator's intent when there are meaningful clues negating a broad 
charitable intent but the testator has not "otherwise expressly provided." 
Furthermore, a testator who expressly provides for a gift-over may desire to 
serve a broad charitable purpose but does not intend the gift-over to take 
effect until the broad objective fails.1 4 This intent would be defeated by a 
literal application of the statute if the gift-over were construed as a clear 
expression "otherwise," just as strict adherence to the literal terms of the 
will under present rules may defeat the intention of the testator who clearly 
had the broad intent.15 
Perhaps the advantages of the statute could be realized while avoiding 
its defects by presuming the existence of a general intent unless the contrary 
is shown. This more flexible approach is less likely to defeat the testator's 
intent because a court would be free to consider all clues to dominant intent, 
which is the touchstone of cy pres. 
Stuart S. Gunckel 
13 In re Butnick's Will, 99 N.Y.S.2d 101 (Surr. Ct. 1950); Matter of Dillenback, 189 
Misc. 538, 74 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Surr. Ct. 1947); Fairbanks v. Appleton, 249 Wis. 476, 24 N.W.2d 
893 (1946); Matter of Neher, 279 N.Y. 370, 18 N.E.2d 625 (1939); Matter of Dean, 167 
Misc. 238, 3 N.Y.S.2d 711 (Surr. Ct. 1938); Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Williams, 
supra note 4. 
14 A broad intent can exist although there are residual gifts to catch the specific 
bequests which fail. Shannon v. Eno, 120 Conn. 77, 179 Atl. 479 (1935); Bridgeport-City 
Trust Co. v. Bridgeport Hospital, 120 Conn. 27, 179 Atl. 92 (1935). It is not impossible 
to say that a broad intent exists although there is a direct gift-over after a specific bequest 
to a charity. Hartford Nat'! Bank &: Trust Co. v. Oak Bluffs First Baptist Church, 116 
Conn. 347, 164 Atl. 910 (1933). 
15 Scott, Education and the Dead Hand, 34 HARV. L. REv. I, 14 (1920); Citizens &: 
Manufacturer's Nat'! Bank v. Guilbert, 121 Conn. 520, 526, 186 Atl. 564, 567 (1936); Keene 
v. Eastman, 75 N.H. 191, 72 Atl. 213 (1909). 
